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ABSTRACT
The authors develop a political economy framework to study the post- September 11th 
environmental changes and firm responses in the owner/operator sector of the U.S. 
motorcoach industry. Based on a comprehensive analysis of both evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes in the competitive and regulatory environments faced by the firms 
in this industry, their policy and strategic responses to the terrorist acts of September 11, 
2001, on U.S. soil are examined. The industry’s response is captured (i.e., collective action 
response) by surveying 163 firms operating and competing in the owner/operator sector of 
the U.S. motorcoach industry. Several descriptive statistics are synthesized and analyzed 
for a structured presentation of the survey findings. In conclusion, contributions and 
limitations of this study, as well as directions for future research, are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. transportation sectors adapted promptly 
to the challenges engendered by the terror 
attacks on U.S. soil September 11, 2001. 
Though initially grounded at U.S. borders, 
motor carriers responded effectively to 
requests for expedited shipments. Rail faced 
some slowdowns, but recovered quickly 
enough for Norfolk Southern to contribute
1,000 rail cars to transport debris free of 
charge in the World Trade Center cleanup 
(Morton, Hyland, Aichlmayr, and Freeze 
2001). The U.S. air cargo carriers suffered 
heavy losses when the Federal Aviation 
Association banned air travel for two days 
following the attacks on Washington D.C., 
and New York City (Freeze 2001), but was 
back to full speed by week’s end. Though 
these short term coordinated efforts returned 
the nation’s transportation and logistics 
networks to normal and this operational 
recovery provided some sense of security, 
much less is known about specific policy and 
strategic responses to terrorism-induced 
environmental change faced by specific 
sectors of the transportation network.
The purpose of this research is to identify the 
emerging patterns of policy changes to 
episodic events of terror and systemic 
strategic responses in emergency prepared­
ness of the owner/operator sector of the 
motorcoach industry in light of the attacks 
and subsequent war. The vehicle to explain 
such reaction is the political economy 
framework (see Stern and Reve 1980, and 
Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983).
This transportation sector’s response 
patterns are analyzed by looking at the 
actions and intentions of the firms operating 
and competing in the U.S. motorcoach 
industry in the months following the terror 
attacks on New York City and Washington 
D.C. The focus on the owner/operator sector
of the motorcoach industry as the backdrop is 
due to this sector’s functioning at the 
boundary of transportation and travel/ 
tourism industries, as both of these 
industries have been hit hard by terror 
(Pizam and Fleicher 2002). Before discussing 
the results of the research, a review of the 
state of the U.S. motorcoach industry is 
presented.
THE U.S. MOTORCOACH INDUSTRY: 
FOCUS ON ITS OWNER/OPERATOR 
SECTOR
The charter and tour portion of the motor­
coach business tend to be family-owned, 
requiring long hours with much of the 
charter work occurring on weekends. It 
involves enormous capital expenditures offset 
by historical 15-20% profit margins. During 
the late 1990’s many changes occurred which 
had tremendously negative effects on the 
industry. Consolidation was a leading threat 
to many independents. Revenue was flat, 
new equipment costs were escalating and 
overcapacity in the market was becoming 
commonplace. Marketing was a virtually 
unknown concept with owners adopting an 
order-taking approach rather than marketing 
their business. Low entry barriers 
encouraged small, inexperienced players to 
join. Lending companies encouraged new 
entrants and rapid growth with 
comparatively easy financing terms resulting 
in increased sales of new equipment. Motor­
coach companies were viewed by many 
customers as undifferentiated, with price as 
the major distinguishing factor. Therefore, 
when the new entrants finally realized the 
total operating costs, these companies could 
not afford the payments and repossessions 
became commonplace.
The motorcoach industry is comprised of 
three major business segments: charter, 
linehaul, and tour. The largest segment,
48 Journal of Transportation Management
charter work, which represents hauling 
persons from point to point, comprises 72% of 
the business, yet represents the lowest 
margin. Line haul (e.g., designated routes 
from city to city or to airport terminals) 
represents 18% of all motorcoach business 
and tour groups comprise 10% of the 
motorcoach business. During the late 1990’s 
tour groups represented 14% of the business 
in the industry and line hauls were 15% of 
the business. The demand for motorcoach 
tours has fallen while the demand for line 
hauls has risen, yet few owner/operators are 
involved in line haul business. Almost 96% 
of the motorcoach companies are involved in 
charter operations (i.e., the hiring of a 
motorcoach for a specific group) and only 12% 
of the companies are involved in line hauls. 
Those companies operating routes utilize 
approximately 8,000 to 10,000 motorcoaches 
and account for 50 percent of all motorcoach 
mileage (UMA, 2001).
The motorcoach provision market is made up 
of two core groups: independents and 
consolidators. While the independents 
represent small and mid-size companies and 
a handful of large companies, the recent 
trend toward consolidation has emphasized 
the negative state that the industry faces. 
Consolidation by the three largest players 
(CoachUSA, Laidlaw and VEC Tours) was at 
first envisioned to develop economies of scale 
due to vastness in size and characterized by 
centralized management and operating 
efficiencies. However, the resulting overall 
financial performance has not been superior 
to the independent operators and regionally 
managed consolidators have not best served 
the interests of customers in developing on­
going relationships.
In a 2000 Survey conducted by R. L. Banks & 
Associates, the motorcoach industry was 
estimated to be comprised of roughly 4,000 
firms and about 10 percent of those are based
in Canada (Schulz 2001). These companies 
operate approximately 44,000 buses. The 
companies in the industry range from very 
small (those companies with less than five 
coaches) to the largest consolidator that has 
almost 3700 coaches. About ninety percent of 
the industry is comprised of small businesses 
operating fewer than 25 coaches. These 
companies run about 19,000 buses or slightly 
more than two-fifths (40 percent) of the total 
fleet and account for almost two-fifths of the 
total industry mileage. It is estimated that 
almost 2000 companies operate with fewer 
than 5 coaches and 65% of the companies are 
operating with fewer than 10 buses (ABA, 
2000). Yet, the industry provides jobs for 
almost 200,000 workers and generates 
approximately $7.4 billion in business.
The mid-sized segment is comprised of 
approximately 320 firms that operate 
between 25 and 99 buses each. These 
companies run about 14,000 buses or almost 
one-third (31 percent) of the fleet and 
account for about one-third of the industry 
mileage (ABA, 2000).
The large segment in the industry is 
comprised of 50 firms that operate 100 or 
more buses (UMA, 2001). The top 50 firms 
had total buses in 2001 of 19,047 but the 
total had fallen to 14,007 by the beginning of 
2002 (Starcic, 2002). The largest companies 
operate about 11,000 buses or about one- 
fourth (25%) of the fleet and drive 30 percent 
of the total industry mileage (ABA, 2000).
Each motorcoach carries over 20,000 
passengers per year on average, although 
there are wide variations between firms, with 
larger operations and scheduled service 
companies reporting higher average 
ridership. Larger carriers, those operating 
100 or more buses, carry an average of
26,000 passengers per bus annually. The 
mid-size companies range between 9,000 to
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18,000 passengers per bus. Smaller 
companies with fewer than 24 buses carry 
about 9,000 passengers per bus annually 
(ABA, 2000).
A fully loaded motorcoach (i.e., 46 passengers 
on average) on a charter or tour making an 
overnight stay contributes an average of 
$5,000 to $7,500 per day to the local economy 
in expenditures including meals, lodging, 
shopping, admission fees, souvenirs and local 
taxes (ABA, 2000). The 1996 direct economic 
impact of the group tour business in North 
America was more than $11.6 billion. In 
Washington, D. C. alone, 23.4 percent of 21 
million annual visitors arrive by motorcoach. 
If only half of those visitors came as part of 
an overnight tour, $424 million flows into 
those local businesses (George Washington 
University, 2001).
Three consolidators are key players in the 
industry. Coach USA has 3,685 motor- 
coaches and is comprised of 188 companies 
representing 10% of the industry. Laidlaw 
Greyhound owns 2775 motorcoaches and is 
predominantly a line haul company with less 
that 1% of their business generated by tours 
and charters. VEC Tours has 870 motor- 
coaches and represents 1% of the business 
with 16 companies (Starcic, 2002). In U.S. 
Bankruptcy Courts, VEC filed for Chapter 
Eleven bankruptcy protection from creditors 
as business plummeted as a result of the 
terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Though 
motorcoach carriage represents a mere 2% of 
overall passenger transport in the U.S., 
motorcoach carriers transport more 
passengers in two weeks than Amtrak 
transports in an entire year. Thus, how this 
industry responds to terror may offer insight 
into other transport sectors and to business 
in general.
THE STUDY
For the development of the analytical 
framework to guide the study, it was 
important to distinguish between two 
emerging constructs in the extant literature, 
emergency preparedness and homeland 
security. Emergency preparedness is related 
to the proactive groundwork laid by firms in 
their contingency preparation for potential 
acts of terrorism. On the one hand, terrorism 
by its very nature is episodic. On the other 
hand, homeland security is systemic. That 
is, homeland security is the operating 
foundation/force of a firm’s emergency pre­
paredness policy. In other words, it is not a 
matter of choice, but rather it has to be 
considered an imperative in light of the 
episodes of terror or threats of terror. As a 
result, it has become an integral part of a 
firm’s decision making context for risk 
management.
Following the foundational work by Stern 
and Reve (1980) and Achrol, Reve, and Stern 
(1983), the model for empirical examination 
of industry-wide response to terror in the 
motorcoach industry is a political economy 
framework. The political economy frame­
work adapted for the post-9/11 motorcoach 
industry environment is capsulated in Figure 
1. As indicated, there are two primary 
driving forces: (1) evolutionary changes in the 
competitive environment (e.g., consolidation 
and restructuring processes), and (2) 
revolutionary changes in the regulatory 
environment (e.g., homeland security, 
policies, and practices after September 11th). 
Both drivers have mutually interacting 
economy components and a polity. These 
forces then influence the operating environ­
ments of the firms competing in the 
motorcoach industry, eliciting their policy
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responses (e.g., emergency preparedness) and 
strategic responses (e.g., acquisitions and 
restructuring intentions).
Grounded in the model of a political 
economy-adapted framework of post-9/11 
environmental change in the motorcoach 
industry (See Figure 1), the study seeks to 
make a significant contribution to emerging 
arena of research examining how homeland 
security changes are mapped onto emergency 
preparedness as a firm’s proactive approach 
to the threat of episodic terror events, often 
mandated through regulatory intervention.
An additional unique contribution of this 
research is the unit of analysis. The 
members fo the sample frame are owner/ 
operators. Owner/operators have received 
very little attention in transportation and 
tourism travel research, as the most common 
sampling is done at the customer or 
passenger level. In our study, we queried 
owner/operators in order to assess firm-level 
responses and intentions in a post-9/11 
marketplace.
FIGURE 1
POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK OF POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE IN THE MOTORCOACH INDUSTRY
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Note, in Figure 1, the role of government 
(i.e., federal, state, local) has been omitted 
from the equation (i.e., model) of environ­
mental change in the motorcoach industry. 
In contrast to the bailing out of the airline 
industry by federal mandates, the motor- 
coach industry was forced to absorb the cost 
of change. In general, it is crucial to define 
the concepts, related issues, policies, and 
practices of homeland security and emer­
gency preparedness at governmental, firm, 
and emerging industry levels in order to 
explain how the interaction between changes 
in regulatory and competitive environments 
influence the outcomes and interactions of 
motorcoach firms’ plicy and strategic 
responses.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Owner/operators of motorcoach firms in the 
U.S. were chosen as key informants in order 
to capture the most robust data available. 
Respondents filled out a detailed question­
naire at one of two national conventions in 
January and February, 2002. Data were 
recorded and analyzed in the spring and 
summer of 2002. This sample represents 
owner/operators that try to proactively 
shape collective strategies within the two 
associations that face a radically changing 
political economy environment and act on 
behalf of the entire sectorial membership.
Population and Sampling Issues
The population of interest in this research 
was all motorcoach operators in the U.S. as 
of September 11, 2001. The sample frame of 
interest consisted of all those owner/ 
operators in attendance at one of two 
national conventions: Indianapolis in 
January 2002, and Orlando in February 
2002.
Following Campbell (1955), key informants 
were asked to fill out questionnaires. Key 
informants are identified as owner/operators 
of motorcoaches in U.S. markets. Key 
informant bias may exist in the context of 
gathering information in the form of 
questionnaires (Phillips, 1982), and may 
create measurement bias. However, Camp­
bell (1955) and Anderson (1985) demonstrate 
that key informants provide highly accurate 
data when they are knowledgeable and 
communicate with the social scientist. 
Campbell (1955) suggests that questions be 
direct, specific, and in the language of the 
informant. An expert in the industry was 
engaged in an effort to ensure the data 
collection method used here met the criteria 
set forth by Campbell. Questions were 
designed to achieve clear, specific responses, 
confined to issues the respondents likely 
knew and were expressed in their terms. 
Respondents were assured of anonymity 
(Jobber and O’Reilly, 1998) in order to 
receive unbiased responses.
Sample Frame
Motorcoach operators were surveyed at two 
national conventions. The first convention 
was the United Motorcoach Association 
(UMA) Convention held in Indianapolis in 
January 2002. There were approximately 
250 operators in attendance and survey 
responses were collected from 100 of the 
operators attending the conference. 
Additional surveys were collected at the 
American Bus Association (ABA) 
Convention. This meeting was held in 
February 2002 in Orlando. This meeting 
brought together a specific group of motor­
coach owner/operators that sell tours to meet 
with convention bureaus, restaurants, hotels 
and destination representatives. At this 
meeting, an additional 63 surveys were
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collected. Only motorcoach owner/operators 
were surveyed. Some owner/operators 
attended both meetings. If they had 
previously completed the survey at the 
UMA, they did not complete the survey 
again at the ABA. In all, 163 owner/ 
operators completed the questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to fill out the 
survey on site and were encouraged to fill 
out the survey in its entirety.
Data Analysis
The data were recorded and analyzed using 
SPSS 10.1 software. One hundred sixty 
three useable responses were included in the 
primary database.
From Table 1 note that all major geo­
graphical areas in the U.S. are represented. 
Thirty-nine percent of the sample was from 
the Midwest, 38% from the Eastern 
Seaboard, 14% from the South and 9% from 
the West Coast. Approximately 90% of the 
sample was involved in family owned 
businesses and 38% operated from more 
than one location. In the motorcoach 
business, it is common for many owner/ 
operators to have related businesses that 
supplement their motorcoach business. In 
the sample, 35% of the owner/operators 
responding indicated that they were also 
involved in school bus operations.
Nearly one-third of the respondents operated 
in 2000 with annual sales between one and 
three million dollars, while 11% showed 
sales of greater than $5 million. Twenty- 
seven percent of the companies have annual 
gross sales of less than $500,000, with 15% 
having gross sales of equal to or less than 
$250,000. Only 5% of the companies fall 
within the $500,001-$750,000 range and
17% of the respondents fall within the 
$750,001-$1,000,000 range. The largest 
group in the sample, 31%, falls within the 
$l,000,000-$3,000,000 range. Eight percent 
of the respondents indicated that their gross 
sales were in the $3,000,000-$5,000,000 
range and 11% of the respondents indicated 
that they had gross sales greater than 
$5,000,000.
POST 9/11 RESPONSES TO TERROR 
IN THE U. S. MOTORCOACH 
INDUSTRY
Operational Responses
September 11 has had a profound effect on 
the travel industry. The motorcoach 
industry is an important niche in the travel 
arena. Motorcoaches in the U.S. and 
Canada carried an estimated 860 million 
passengers in 1999.
Sixty-one percent of the owner/operators 
responding to the survey indicated that their 
customers are now requesting shorter trips 
(Table 2). Customers have indicated their 
unwillingness to travel to larger cities (Table 
3), particularly along the Eastern Seaboard, 
and owner/operators have responded with 
creative and interesting destinations closer 
to their homes. If the days traveled and 
distances vary considerably, the operator 
will generate less revenue on average. 
Increased business will be required to offset 
the loss. This is further compounded when 
it is noted that 68% of owner operators 
indicated that some of their customers had 
been ordered not to travel (Table 4). Many 
school districts across the country have been 
ordered not to travel or, if they do travel on 
school sponsored activities, they must avoid 
larger cities.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL GROSS SALES
Annual Sales Frequency Percent of Total
<$250,000 22 13.5
$250,000- $500,000 17 11.8
$500,001 - $750,000 7 4.9
$750,001 - $1,000,000 25 17.4
$1,000,001 - $3,000,000 45 31.3
$3,000,001 - $5,000,000 12 8.3
> $5,000,000 16 11.1
Missing 9
TOTALS 163 100.0%
TABLE 2
CUSTOMERS REQUESTING SHORTER TRIPS
Requesting shorter Frequency Percent of Total
trips?
YES 97 60.6
NO 63 39.4
TOTALS 160 100.0%
TABLE 3
TRIP DEMAND PROXIMITY TO HOME
Requesting trips closer Frequency Percent of Total
to home?
YES 98 61.3
NO 62 38.7
TOTALS 160 100.0%
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TABLE 4
CUSTOMERS ORDERED NOT TO TRAVEL
Ordered not to travel?
YES
NO
TOTALS
Frequency
106
50
156
Percent of Total
67.5
31.8
99.3%
Nearly 60% of owner/operators indicate 
their customers are requesting shorter trips. 
Similarly, 61% are demanding motorcoach 
trips closer to their place of residence. One 
hundred and six respondents report that 
previous customers have been ordered not to 
travel.
A mainstay of the charter industry, casino 
charters, has seen some movement as one 
quarter of owner/operators report that 
casino demand has decreased since 9/11, 
and another 15% has seen demand rise 
(Table 5).
These results indicate that, under the 
diffuse effects of political-institutional 
factors, the owner/operators perceive that 
radical environmental change will likely 
require a higher level of operational 
effectiveness within a more localized scope 
of operations.
Emergency Preparedness Responses
The data indicate that nearly 47% of 
owner/operators have developed a security 
plan for their company since 9/11. Thirty 
six firms have sent statements to customers 
regarding those measures (See Table 6). 
Importantly, the line-haul segment would 
most likely be interested with particular 
security measures. Line-haul is simply 
moving passengers from point to point, with 
low likelihood the driver gets to know the
passenger, as opposed to charter or tour 
where the driver spends a significant amount 
of time with the same set of passengers on 
their excursions.
An analysis of the emergency preparedness 
variables indicates a mixed response to terror 
by owner/operators in the sample. For 
instance, one would expect greater attention 
to security measures for equipment, drivers, 
and passengers. Indeed, results indicate that 
some of these measures are being taken. 
Forty six percent of respondents have issued 
identification tags for drivers. Additionally, 
nearly 81% of respondents indicate that they 
are vigilantly keeping equipment and 
baggage service areas locked while not in 
use. Seventy percent of respondents noted 
they had installed phones in the coaches, and 
an additional 49% installed two-way radios. 
Communication tools allow tours to operate 
smoothly and allows for coordination.
However, some results appear to be counter­
intuitive. Only 17 % of respondents indicate 
they issue security labels for all baggage. 
Less than 9% have installed plexi-glass 
designed to protect the driver of the coach. 
And only 8% have plans to install cameras 
aboard their coaches.
Interestingly, only 20 firms responded that 
they are checking all baggage before loading 
and merely 43 have increased security 
equipment in their garage.
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TABLE 5
CASINO BUSINESS
Casino demand since Frequency
9/11
Increased 25
Decreased 40
No Change 95
TOTALS 160
Percent of Total
15.6
25
59.4
100%
TABLE 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Emergency Preparedness Items Yes No
Developed a Security Plan 73 84
Notified customers of security plans 36 121
Issued ID tags for drivers 73 84
Issue security labels for all baggage 27 131
Baggage and service areas kept locked 128 31
Installed plexi-glass to shield driver compartment 14 143
Installed phones in motorcoach 108 46
Installed cameras in motorcoach 12 144
Installed 2-way radios in motorcoach 76 80
Increased driver training on handling aggressive passengers 66 91
Increased driver training on awareness of surroundings and safety 111 46
Increased security equipment for garage 43 113
Checking baggage before loading 20 137
Security issues are a major concern 49 108
The nature of line-haul and charter or tour 
business may explain the disparity in the 
data. Security issues and measures appear 
to be far different to line-haul operators 
because of the unknown passenger 
construct. That is, it seems logical an 
unknown passenger, or unfamiliar one, 
would pose more of a threat from the driver’s 
perspective, than a known one, or one whom 
the driver is able to establish a level of
rapport with during an extended excursion. 
The level of risk varies across groups of 
passengers. For example, groups of students 
and teachers or groups of senior citizen 
passengers pose far less of a concern than 
autonomous, non-group passengers.
Evidently, owner/operators have different 
mental models of policy demands in the post 
9/11 political economy. In other words, due
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to the radical and systemic scope of 
environmental change, there is a lot of 
ambiguity in this industry sector of how the 
regulatory and competitive compo-nents of 
the anticipated institutional change will 
eventually interact. These results indicate 
the need for trade associations to build 
collective represen-tation of the anticipated 
institutional change in order to build a 
collective capacity to influence public 
policies.
Recently, the Over-the-Road Bus Security 
and Safety Act of 2001 (H.R. 3429) and a 
companion bill in the Senate, S. 1739, 
generated much discussion in the bus 
industry. This bill was the first ever 
designed to provide aid to the private bus 
industry. It seeks to establish a $200 
million competitive grant program 
administered by the Secretary of 
Transportation to upgrade security for 
buses, drivers, and facilities. The two major 
associations representing the motorcoach 
industry were at odds over this bill. The 
ABA was instrumental in the creation of the 
bill. However, the UMA was opposed to the 
financing source (Kane, 2002). The bill 
requires all commercial bus operators to pay 
25 cents per passenger to fund the program. 
Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. 
Mineta could begin making grants after a 
year of collection.
In April 2002, the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
approved legislation that would provide $400 
million in security grants to private 
motorcoach operators. Under this bill, 
operators could apply for grants to help 
protect their drivers, implement passenger­
screening programs, construct or modify 
existing terminals, train employees in threat
assessment, hire security officers, and 
install video surveillance and communi­
cations equipment (ABA, 2002). The House 
bill seeks $600 million.
Strategic Responses
Several items captured strategic imperatives 
or initiatives in the survey. Strategic 
responses refer to long-term planning and 
intent vis-a-vis acquisitions, restructuring, 
and future markets in which to compete. 
Only 10 percent of our respondents were 
considering selling their business as a result 
of the events on September 11th (Table 7). 
Twenty-two firms, in fact, are considering 
expansion via buying out competitors. Only 
two firms were actively seeking a 
consolidator (e.g., one of the major three 
consolidators) to purchase their operations 
and assets, while nine firms indicate 
willingness to merge with another firm.
Greater than one-third, however, indicate 
their intention to restructure their 
operations as a result of the terrorist acts. 
Additionally, 54% have seen their tour 
business change, 60% have seen charter 
business change and nearly one-fourth have 
seen their bus operations change. This 
change in traditional operations necessitates 
a strategic response.
These results indicate that the owner/ 
operator responses vary on the tactics- 
strategy continuum. Evidently, they perceive 
differentially how the relationship between 
institutional processes (i.e., cognitive beliefs 
about the power dynamics in the sector) and 
direct state actions (i.e., regulatory or 
coercive mechanisms) will eventually impact 
the competitive structure of their sector.
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TABLE 7
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Strategic Issue 
Considering selling business 
Considering purchasing competitor 
Seeking consolidator to buy out 
Considering restructuring 
Changing school bus operations 
Changing tour operations 
Changing charter operations 
Considering strategic merger
Affirmative Negative
16 144
22 138
2 156
54 100
36 114
86 73
96 63
9 150
Perceived Overall Impact on the 
Motorcoach Industry
General perceptions of the impact of episodic 
events of terror and resultant strategies and 
policies on homeland security were also 
captured in the data. One hundred and 
eleven respondents indicated their belief 
that the terror acts have impacted the 
overall industry negatively (Table 8).
Many respondents (60%) indicate that many 
of their competitors have gone out of 
business (Table 9). Furthermore, competi­
tive proximity seems to be expanding in 
response to the uncertainty and shakeup in 
the industry since September 11th, as 102 
respondents specify their geographic market 
expanding as a result of the changes since 
September 11th. Ninety three respondents 
indicate their belief that the industry will 
improve by these changes.
In the three months following the terrorist 
attacks, most motorcoach carriers lost 
business (Table 10). While 13 respondents 
reported business revenue actually jumped 
in the three months following the attacks, 
most reported losses. Nearly 65% reported
losses for fourth quarter 2001 between 
$5000 and $100,000.
The central argument here is that during 
the short time period of the post 9/11 
transformation of the political economy faced 
by this sector, the influences of institutional 
change vary in their impacts on 
owner/operators’ cognitive model reflecting 
their future competitive posture.
FURTHER INTERPRETATION 
AND DISCUSSION
Interpreting these descriptive statistics 
leads to insight into an industry’s response 
to terror, both in the short-term shore-up 
type activities and in long-term, strategic 
quests.
The research results indicate that, while 
many customers have been ordered not to 
travel, those that are traveling are 
demanding shorter trips and trips that are 
closer to home. It would appear that these 
clients are not intimidated by the terrorism, 
yet are cautious, staying closer to home in 
case the need arises to return quickly.
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TABLE 8
INDUSTRY HAS BEEN NEGATIVELY AFFECTED
Overall [-] Affect? YES NO
111 40
TABLE 9
COMPETITIVE RESPONSE
Competitive Items
Competitors have gone out of business 
Competitors expanding proximity 
Business will improve from changes in 
industry
Affirmative
94
102
93
Negative
64
54
60
TABLE 10
LOST BUSINESS IN 4th QUARTER, 2001
$ Revenue lost Frequency Percent Cumulative %
<$5000 17 11.5 11.5
$5001 - $20000 30 20.3 31.8
$20001 - $50000 35 23.6 55.4
$50001 - $100000 31 20.9 76.4
$100001 - $200000 6 4.1 80.4
>$200000 16 10.8 91.2
Business increased 13 8.8 100.0
Similarly, demand for casino business seems 
to indicate that passengers are not canceling 
scheduled trips, rather reallocating their 
desired destinations.
Emergency preparedness has recently 
received attention in the public administra­
tion literature. Nearly half of the owner 
operators in the survey indicate that new
security plans had been developed in the 
wake of the September 11th terror attacks 
and their aftermath. This indicates a pro­
active approach to emergency preparation, 
rather than reactive strategies. 
Interestingly, a small fraction (22.9%) of the 
respondents actually communicate that 
strategy and emergency preparedness to 
customers. This represents an incredible
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marketing opportunity, as relaying these 
efforts may decrease customer’s dissonance 
and increase confidence in ridership.
Another opportunity for owner/operators to 
relieve fear of travel would be to implement 
tagging procedures, an activity only 17 % of 
the sample has adopted. Further, the half of 
the sample that has not yet issued identi­
fication tags for their drivers may be wise to 
do so.
It appears other actions toward emergency 
preparedness (e.g., installation of plexi­
glass, installation of phones, two-way radios, 
cameras and other communications equip­
ment) is a step in the right direction toward 
safety and emergency preparation. Driver 
training (for greater awareness of pas­
sengers and surroundings) is another step in 
emergency preparation hailed by this 
industry. Though the handling of aggressive 
passengers is nondescript, it appears that 
greater training and preparation would be in 
order.
Strategic responses were also captured in 
the research. Only 16 firms reported their 
intent to sell given the aftermath of 
terrorism on the industry. More likely to be 
seen is not a restructuring of the industry on 
a macro level, but rather strategic 
restructuring of individual firms within the 
industry. Of the three major segments (e.g., 
charter, tour, and school), the greatest 
impact was seen in charter operations. This 
indicates that strategic initiatives in the 
industry in the short-term to mid-term will 
likely involve segmentation initiatives.
By a 3-to-2 margin, respondents reported that 
direct competitors have gone out of business 
as a result of 9/11. It seems far more likely 
that a motor carrier will see competitive 
pressure from motorcoach carriers from 
further and further away from its base
operation than to see those carriers go out of 
business. Nevertheless, carriers must 
concentrate on shoring up their own business 
by offering closer-to-home and more frequent 
excursions.
While a vast majority of the sample 
respondents reported lost revenue (only 13 of 
163 reported increased revenues), the lasting 
effect is uncertain. Is this lost revenue 
canceled business or merely postponed 
business? It could prove insightful to 
determine the answer. Clearly, the business 
that was education related was canceled 
entirely, as service-oriented business is 
time-dependent. In other words, if that 
business was scheduled for a particular date, 
then canceled, it is a lost opportunity and is 
non-recoverable (academic years and athletic 
seasons conclude). Knowing the answer may 
also determine a true recovery from pent-up 
demand recoverable only in the very short­
term.
In summary, the requirements of homeland 
security imply changes not only in the 
political economy/ institutional environment 
but also in numerous aspects affecting the 
functioning of the owner/operator segment of 
the motorcoach industry. As these changes 
are profound and systemic in nature, they 
demand new policy and operational and 
strategic responses by owner/operators and 
their trade associations. Specifically, 
although the changes in the regulatory en­
vironment are revolutionary and those in the 
com-petitive environment are evolutionary, 
the effects of the former lag behind those of 
the latter (see Figure 1). Therefore, 
owner/operators in the motorcoach industry 
need to make individualized, yet concerted 
dynamic and credible commitments to 
policies and strategies in the new 
“punctuated” institutional environment that 
they face. The dynamics and the extent of 
these commitments will vary across owner/
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operator firms in terms of the trade-offs that 
they individually make within their 
functional and cognitive models of the sector 
and its environ-mental change.
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
While insights were obtained into an indus­
try’s response to terrorism, the research is 
by no means definitive. While data analysis 
was initially limited to dichotomous right- 
hand-side variables, this was a conscious set 
of tradeoffs due to the delicate nature of the 
topic, lack of public data available from the 
unit of interest, and the salient role the 
industry’s association (i.e., the UMA) played 
in articulating a collective response to the 
new environment. Further, previous 
research (Arimond and ElFessi 2001) 
determined that very few market surveys 
are used in tourism-related studies as 
Likert-type scales are perceived as too 
tedious and demanding for the respondent 
and are less likely to capture the 
respondents’ intent than a smaller dichoto­
mous quantitative scale (Mazenac 1984, 
Cheung 1994).
Importantly, the UMA and ABA provided 
access to the population sample frame of 
interest. Collectively, these associations 
wanted to capture responses and intentions, 
and were not interested in their members 
perceptions (e.g., psychometric captured by 
a likert scaled instrument), but rather in 
firm behavior. In sum, the associations 
wanted to capture collective action.
While the sample captured 163 robust 
responses, as in all survey research 
(Anderson, 1985) it is possible that those 
responding are quite different from non­
respondents. The data are further limited in 
that it was collected from different members
at two locations, but a second wave of ques­
tionnaires was not viable. Thus, comparing 
latter respondents to early respondents was 
infeasible.
Another limitation is that only those owner 
operators attending one of two major 
conferences were included in t he sample 
frame. Perhaps those owner/operators not 
attending could offer very different insights 
into strategic and competitive responses to 
terrorism.
Several future research streams seem viable 
and ought to be pursued. First, this re­
search sought answers from a single sector 
of transportation and cannot be confidently 
generalized across all sectors of trans­
portation. However, seeing if other sectors 
responded similarly may offer insight into 
how service providers respond strategically 
to such situations.
Future research should seek to discover 
whether there exist any significant clusters 
in the data. Cluster analysis might identify 
segments with varying tactics and strategies 
in response to terrorism. If these clusters 
can be identified, then a normative model 
might then be produced.
Moreover, combining clustering analysis 
with other methodological techniques as 
suggested by Kechen and Shook (1995) 
might reveal valuable insight. One signifi­
cant step is to analyze the clusters in an 
attempt to determine specific similarities 
and differences among companies in their 
post-9/11 responses.
Further theories should be examined to 
determine whether an industry left to fend for 
itself without governmental intervention can 
absorb the cost and respond with collective 
action regarding homeland security.
Spring 2003 61
CONCLUSION
This research makes a significant contri­
bution to the emerging arena of homeland 
security and the impact of change of this 
type on the firms operating and competing in 
the U.S. motorcoach industry. Unlike emer­
gency preparedness, which is a firm’s 
proactive approach to the threat of episodic 
terror events and often mandated through 
regulatory intervention, homeland security 
is a systemic construct and transpires when 
the rules of the game change.
Environmental change was modeled in a 
transportation and tourism sector based on 
the political economy framework. This 
framework seems to support well the design 
of this empirical study intended to capture
the collective response to the changing 
environment of the motorcoach industry 
post-9/11. Several descriptive statistics were 
analyzed and explained. Future directions 
for greater understanding were then offered.
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